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C HAP T E R 12 
Evidence 
PAUL J. LIACOS 
§12.1. Criminal identification evidence. The United States Supreme 
Court announced four major decisions in the years 1967 and 1968 de-
fining the rights of defendants in regard to so-called identification evi-
dence. l The application of the principles enunciated in these cases has 
given the courts of the Commonwealth some degree of difficulty and has 
resulted in a flood of cases2 in the Supreme Judicial Court. 
United States v. Wade3 and Gilbert v. California4 established a Con-
stitutional right to counsel at pretrial identification proceedings. In both 
cases, individuals who had been indicted for crimes were observed and 
identified by witnesses at lineups where they were not represented by 
counsel. The United States Supreme Court held in Wade that a pretrial 
identification procedure, such as a lineup, was a "critical stage" of 
criminal proceedings and that the Sixth Amendment entitled the ac-
cused to the assistance of counsel in order to counter the many dangers 
that such a procedure could present. Both cases ruled that it was con-
stitutional error to admit an in-court identification in evidence where 
the witness had participated in a pretrial lineup or showup at which 
accused was unrepresented by counsel unless the prosecution could es-
tablish "by clear and convincing evidence" that the identification was 
based on knowledge which was independent of the lineup and "un-
tainted" by" that viewing. Gilbert further held that testimony by any 
witness that he identified the accused at a pretrial lineup is excludible 
per se if the accused was not represented by counsel. Because such testi-
mony is the "direct result of the illegal lineup," the fact that there may 
have been an independent source of recognition is immaterial. 
PAUL]' LIACOS is a Professor of Law at Boston University and a partner in the 
firm of Liacos & Liacos. 
§12.1. I United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 
388 U.S. 263 (1967); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967); Simmons v. United 
States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968). These cases are discussed in Liacos, Right to Counsel: 
Line Ups and Confessions, 32 A.T.L.L.]. 561 (1968); see also 1969 Ann. Surv. 
Mass. Law §§12.1-12.8. 
2 See 1969 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §12.8; 1970 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §§15.1-
15.3. 
3 388 U.S. 218 (1967). 
4 388 U.S. 263 (1967). 
5 388 U.S. 293 (1967). 
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Stovall v. Denno5 and Simmons v. United States6 applied the Constitu-
tional due process guarantees to pretrial identification procedures. These 
cases involved pretrial identification procedures which were not within 
the collective scope of Wade and Gilbert and the Sixth Amendment pro-
tections articulated therein. In Stovall, the confrontation between the 
witness and the accused occurred prior to a date which the Supreme 
Court had fixed to avoid retroactive application of Wade and Gilbert. 
In Simmons, the witnesses had identified the accused by photograph 
prior to his apprehension. Neither case presented circumstances requiring 
the Sixth Amendment protection of assistance of counsel, the Court de-
cided. Instead, it held that due process precludes conduct by law en-
forcement authorities which is unnecessarily suggestive or conducive to 
irreparable mistaken identification. Any determination for purposes of 
this test must be made with regard to the "totality of circumstances" 
surrounding the situation. 
A number of cases decided by the Supreme Judicial Court in the 1972 
SURVEY year dealt with problems of criminal identification evidence 
raised by the cases described above. 
In Commonwealth v. Mendes,' the Court held once again that Miranda 
wamings8 alone are not sufficient to advise a criminal defendant of his 
right to have counsel at a pretrial identification.9 The admission of evi-
dence of a pretrial identification obtained without advice of the right 
to have counsel present at the lineup is reversible error under the per se 
exclusionary rule of Gilbert. However, the per se exclusion relates only 
to evidence of the illegal identification itself. A subsequent in-court identi-
fication may be admitted provided that the trial court finds the in-court 
identification to be untainted by the prior illegal lineup. In Mendes the 
Court discussed whether the taint had been dissipated under the test set 
forth in Wade, and found that the original record in the case was in-
sufficient to permit a decision on that issue. It therefore reversed with 
directions that evidence of the pretrial illegal lineup identification be 
excluded in the event of a new trial. It further directed the judge to 
find specifically whether the in-court identification at the second trial 
(if any) was influenced or tainted by the witness's prior exposure to the 
defendant at the illegal pretrial lineup. 
The Mendes opinion referred to Commonwealth v. ,Tempesta,lo a case 
which illustrates the difficulty that courts have experienced in coming 
to grips with the issues presented by Wade and Gilbert. Tempesta, which 
also involved an illegal pretrial lineup identification procedure, had to 
be remanded twice. The first remand directed the trial judge to determine 
whether the pretrial identification was illegal, and if so whether the 
6 390 U.S. 377 (1968). 
7 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 681, 281 N.E.2d 243. 
8 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
9 See also Commonwealth v. Cooper, 356 Mass. 74, 248 N.E.2d 253 (1969). 
10 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 335, 279 N.E.2d 663. 
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court room identification was tainted thereby. The trial judge was not 
convinced that the defendant understood his right to have counsel present 
at the lineup, but he found that the in-court identification was untainted 
thereby. However, the Supreme Judicial Court remained uncertain 
whether the additional findings dealt with all of the factors enumerated 
in Wade and amplified by the First Circuit in Cooper v. Picard;11 the 
case was therefore remanded for yet another round of fact finding. This 
time the trial judge placed the matter in a different posture, finding in 
exhaustive detail that the witness's in-court identification was based on a 
recollection which was independent of the illegal lineup and that the 
lineup was not sufficiently suggestive to create a substantial likelihood 
of irreparable misidentification. The Supreme Judicial Court accepted 
the trial judge's findings. 
The requirements to establish on appeal that an in-court identification 
was shown by "clear and convincing evidence" to be of independent 
origin froni any pretrial confrontation with a defendant were discussed 
at some length in Commonwealth v. Ross.12 The court had the benefit 
not only of Cooper v. Picard,13 but also of Allen v. Moore,14 a subsequent 
First Circuit decision which elaborated the standards set forth in Wade 
for evaluating the independence of the in-court identification. The six 
factors mentioned in Wade are "( 1) the extent of the witness's opportun-
ity to observe the defendant at the time of the crime; prior errors, if 
any, (2) in description, (3) in identifying any other person or (4) in 
failing to identify the defendant; (5) the receipt of other suggestions; 
and (6) the lapse of time between the crime and the identification."15 
Ross and Allen indicate the primary importance of the opportunity to 
observe the defendant at the time of the crime: "Clearly the firmer the 
contemporaneous impression, the less is the witness subject to be in-
fluenced by subsequent events." The Ross Court also emphasized that 
the trial judge had made detailed factual determinations establishing a 
lack of taint for the in-court identification and it sustained his conclusion 
that "the Commonwealth had satisfied its burden of proving the inde-
pendence of the in-court identifications by 'clear and convincing evidence' 
as United States v. Wade . .. requires."16 (Citations omitted). 
On another point the opinion in Ross specifically addressed the question 
of whether there is any illegality in the use of photographs from police 
files or elsewhere before a defendant is apprehended in an effort to 
identify the defendant for the purpose of making the appropriate arrest. 
The Court here relied upon the Simmons principle that such pretrial 
photographic identifications are not invalid per se; rather they must be 
11 428 F.2d 1351 (1st Cir. 1970). 
12 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 873, 282 N.E.2d 70. 
13 428 F.2d 1351 (1st Cir. 1970). 
14 453 F.2d 970 (1st Cir. 1971). 
15 Id. at 975. 
16 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 877, 282 N.E.2d at 73. 
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tested against standards of due process and fairness because the right to 
counsel cannot apply prior to apprehension. The test of due process and 
fairness is whether the identification procedure was impermissibly sug-
gestive. Finding no such impermissible suggestiveness in this case, and 
also being satisfied that in any event the in-court identification was 
proven to be sufficiently free of taint from the earlier photographic 
viewing, the Court affirmed the conviction. 
The Supreme Judicial Court reached similar conclusions in Common-
wealth v. Finnp Commonwealth v. Roberts18 and Commonwealth v. 
Garvin. 19 In each case, the defendant argued that a pretrial photographic 
identification had influenced or tainted a subsequent in-court identifica-
tion. In each case, the trial court had applied the Simmons standard 
and found that the pretrial procedures were not unnecessarily suggestive, 
nor otherwise defective in a way which gave rise to substantial likelihood 
of irreparable misidentification. In each case, the Supreme Judicial Court 
upheld the findings. 
These cases suggest a remarkably uniform tendency of the Supreme 
Judicial Court to uphold the findings made by lower courts regarding 
the constitutional requirements set down by Wade, Simmons, and related 
decisions. This apparent reluctance to overturn the decisions of trial 
judges is further manifested by two additional cases decided in July of 
1972. 
In Commonwealth v. Thompson,20 the Court predictably affirmed a 
trial judge's ruling that a pretrial identification procedure (this time 
through a two-way mirror at a police station) was not unnecessarily 
suggestive nor a violation of the Fifth Amendment due process principles 
discussed in Stovall v. Denno.21 The Court acknowledged at the outset 
that the weight and credibility due to oral testimony should be decided 
by the trial judge who hears the witnesses, and not by the Supreme 
Judicial Court on appellate review. It then decided that the in-court 
identification of the defendant by one of the witnesses was clearly and 
convincingly shown to be independent of the improper police station 
confrontation. This much of the decision is consistent with the cases 
described above. However, two other witnesses for the Commonwealth 
were also allowed to testify that they had identified the defendant at 
the police station before trial despite the fact that they could not identify 
him at trial. At the time of the pretrial identification, the defendant was 
the only black person in the room. Surprisingly, the Supreme Judicial 
Court allowed the conviction to stand. The purported justification for this 
17 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1285, 285 N.E.2d 105. 
18 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1477, 285 N.E.2d 919. 
19 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1326, 273 N.E.2d 882. 
20 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1503, 286 N.E.2d 333. 
21 Thompson was not governed by Wade or Gilbert because the confronta-
tions had taken place prior to the date prescribed by the Supreme Court after 
which the principles of those cases would govern confrontations between witness 
and accused. 
4
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1972 [1972], Art. 15
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1972/iss1/15
§12.l EVIDENCE 305 
position was Chapter 233, Section 23 'Of the General Laws which pennits 
a . party tD contradict the testimony of his own witness by introducing 
in evidence proof of prior incDnsistent statements made by the witness. 
The testimony of pretrial identificatiDn was thus treated as a priDr in-
consistent statement offered not for prDbative purposes but simply to 
impeach or contradict the witness. The fact that the testimony as tD the 
pretrial identificatiDn preceded the testimDny in which the witnesses 
were unable to identify the defendant at the trial was dismissed by the 
court as a matter within the sound discretion of the trial judge. Except 
for the fact that the improper identification took place before the date 
that the Gilbert principles became effective, this evidence wDuld have 
been excluded per se--a consideratiDn which renders the ,Thompson 
interpretation 'Of the impeachment statute particularly unfortunate. The 
Court further suggested that any error in the admission 'Of the prior 
identifications at trial was harmless beYDnd a reasDnable doubt within 
the meaning of Chapman v. California.22 Even if one accedes tD this 
conclusion and assumes a CDrrect result in Thompson, the case establishes 
a precedent of doubtful validity with regard to the use of the pretrial 
identificatiDn evidence and the interpretatiDn 'Of SectiDn 23 of Chapter 
233. 
Commonwealth v. Marcotte23 is a second questiDnable decision which 
further illustrates the danger 'Of complete deference to a trial court's 
rulings. In this case, a witness testified that her in-cDurt identificatiDn 
was probably aided by her viewing the defendant at a police lineup. The 
in-court identification was allowed anyway 'On the ground that the de-
fendant had previously cDnfessed tD his participation in the crimes 
charged and had stated that he did not want a lawyer present at the 
lineup: the Court reasDned that this conduct waived the defendant's 'Ob-
jection to the identification testimony. The decision offers nothing 'On 
the issue of whether the defendant was adequately advised 'Of his right 
tD cDunsel at the lineup, as distinguished from advice 'On his rights in 
regard to a confession. As previously indicated in discussion 'Of the Mendes 
case, Miranda warnings alDne are not sufficient tD advise the accused 'Of 
his right to counsel at a lineup. The Court in Marcotte, however, made 
no pDint of this at all and simply fDund a lack 'Of error based on waiver 
of the right to counsel. 
The Supreme Judicial Court's reluctance tD reverse a cDnviction where 
there has been a claim of improper in-cDurt identification, or even 'Of 
improper use of pretrial identificatiDn of an accused, may be attributable 
in part to the great volume 'Of cases coming before it invDlving the same 
issues. The Court remarked in Commonwealth v. Finn, "We have con-
sidered issues similar tD thOse raised here in a number of cases .... There 
is nD need . . . for extensive and repetitiDus discussion 'Of the applicable 
22 386 U.S. 18 (1967). 
23 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1511, 286 N.E.2d 337. 
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principles."24 A harsher statement appears in Commonwealth v. 
Murphy,25 another claim of error in identification procedure. A footnote 
to the decision points out that the Court had involved itself with that 
problem forty-seven times since the Supreme Court decisions in 1967 
and 1968. The footnote was appended to the part of the decision which 
affirmed the conviction and denied the claim of improper use of identi-
fication evidence. Citing Wade, Gilbert, Stovall, and Simmons, the Court 
ruled: 
There was no error. If this disposition of the defendant's contentions 
seems curt, peremptory or summary, such treatment of them should 
come as no surprise to anyone who has read the following language 
from our opinion of April 10, 1970, in Commonwealth v. Frank, ... : 
"Once again, therefore, we are referred to United States v. Wade . .. . 
This leads us to comment on the current and understandable num-
ber of matters which have reached us in recent months arising under 
the Wade case or under Gilbert v. California . .. or under Stovall v. 
Denno, .... It does not appear to us that any good purpose would 
be served by further distillation of the Wade essense .... " 
We repeat, reaffirm and emphasize the position which we stated 
in the Frank case because of the continuing stream of cases in which 
this court is asked to review findings of fact by trial judges of the 
admissibility of identification evidence in criminal cases.26 (Citations 
omitted). 
The "position" of Frank and Murphy is that the Court will not disturb 
properly stated findings of the trial judge on the question of the pro-
priety of the pretrial identification, or the question of whether in-court 
identification evidence was tainted as a result. 
One can understand some slight impatience in the Supreme Judicial 
Court regarding the proper application of the law as set out in Wade 
and other cases. However, the question of whether the safeguards defined 
in those cases have been preserved in a particular criminal proceeding 
should not be automatic or perfunctory. It is particularly important that 
pretrial procedures and in-court identifications, and the findings of trial 
courts regarding them, be scrutinized to insure that protections guaranteed 
by the Constitution are available to defendants in criminal proceedings. 
Justice Hennessey, concurring in Murphy, was disturbed enough about 
the Court's position to emphasize that the Supreme Judicial Court should 
do more than simply rubber stamp the findings of trial judges below: 
This court must, where justice requires, substitute its judgment for 
that of a trial judge at the final stage. Not every combination of 
subsidiary findings may be said to meet constitutional standards. 
24 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1285, 1287, 285 N.E.2d 105, 106. 
25 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1679,289 N.E.2d 571. 
26 rd. at 1683-84, 289 N.E.2d at 574. 
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The mere recital of appropriate phrases denoting constitutional ac-
ceptability may serve only to obscure error in admitting the evidence. 
Many pre-trial identification procedures involve some measure of 
suggestiveness. Frequently this is unavoidable. Probably some invalid 
identification methods, even more than illegal interrogation or illegal 
search and seizure, tend to create evidence of guilt where none 
existed before. It is vital that a judge's findings and rulings generated 
by consideration of the principles of the Wade, Stovall and Simmons 
cases should not become pro forma exercises.27 
Mr. Justice Hennessey's position should emphasize the grave responsi-
bility of our Supreme Judicial Court, whether it is dealing with the 
Wade-Gilbert exclusionary rule or with the Stovall-Simmons due process 
rule, to thoroughly and independently evaluate whether a defendant's 
constitutional rights have been protected by the court below. 
A factor which must weigh against the interests of defendants-appellant 
in pretrial identification cases, however, is the shift of position of the 
United States Supreme Court exemplified in Kirby v. Illinois.28 The 
facts in Kirby were similar to those of Wade and Gilbert in relevant 
aspect except that the identification proceeding took place prior to the 
indictment of the accused. The question presented was whether the 
per se exclusionary rule of Gilbe.rt should apply to testimony of an identi-
fication proceeding conducted before an indictment when the accused 
is unrepresented by counsel. The plurality29 decided that it should not. 
Though the Wade and Gilbert opinions had not attached any great im-
portance to the fact that the lineups in those cases took place at the post 
indictment stage, Justice Stewart fixed upon that distinction in Kirby 
to establish a point prior to which the Sixth Amendment guarantee of 
right to counsel will not attach.30 In a vigorous dissent,31 Justice Brennan 
stated, "[I]t should go without saying ... that Wade did not require the 
presence of counsel at pretrial confrontations for identification purposes 
simply on the basis of an abstract consideration of the words 'criminal 
prosecution' in the Sixth Amendment."32 He argued that the Kirby facts 
were fully within the intent and purview of Wade and Gilbert,33 
A number of courts had proceeded under the same misapprehension,34 
27 Id. at 1686-87, 289 N.E.2d at 578. 
28 406 U.S. 682 (1972). 
29 The Chief Justice and Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist concurred in Justice 
Stewart's opinion. Justice Powell concurred in the result. 
30 The fact that the accused was under arrest at the time the identification 
was made was apparently of no importance on this issue. 
31 Justices Douglas and Marshall joined. Justice White felt that the Wade 
and Gilbert decisions governed the Kirby case, and dissented separately. 
32 406 U.S. 682, 697. 
33 For a critical view of what the Supreme Court has done in Kirby, see Note, 
The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 50, 156-164 (1972). 
34 406 U.S. 682, 687 n.5. 
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the Supreme Judicial Court among them. In Commonwealth v. Guillory,35 
the Wade and Gilbert standard was applied to an identification which 
preceded indictment. The situation in Guillory is distinguishable from 
that in Commonweath v. Bumpus36 where the confrontation without 
counsel had occurred almost immediately after the commission of the 
crime. In the latter instance, the Court applied the Stovall test to judge 
the situation on the "totality of the circumstances" and determine whether 
there was an impermissible suggestion in this confrontation which would 
violate due process of law. The position taken by the Supreme Judicial 
Court in the Bumpus and Guillory decisions was based on a commonsense 
approach to the entire problem, and not on a technical question of in-
dictment or complaint. 
Unfortunately, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court reconsidered 
its position in regard to preindictment identification situations in Com-
monwealth v. Lopes,37 decided in September 1972.38 Lopes was charged 
with assault with a dangerous weapon and rape of female child under 
the age of 16 on October 24, 1970. He was viewed by the victim through 
a two-way mirror in the New Bedford Police Station on January 17, 1971. 
The victim also viewed the defendant at a district court hearing on 
January 20, 1971 and at a subsequent trial on March 4, 1971. The vic-
tim's identification testimony was obviously crucial to the outcome. The 
case was tried and the appeal argued after the decisions in Wade, and 
Gilbert and Stovall, but before the decision in Kirby. The defendant 
moved to suppress the pretrial identification testimony of the victim 
on the ground that he had not been informed of his right to have an 
attorney present during any confrontation. The trial judge denied the 
motion on the ground that defendant had waived his right to have 
counsel present at these pretrial identification procedures. When the case 
reached the Supreme Judicial Court, the defendant pressed his argument 
that the identification testimony should not have been allowed at trial. 
The Supreme Judicial Court noted that the lineup in question took place 
after arrest but before the defendant had been indicted or otherwise 
formally charged with any criminal offense. Relying on Kirby, the Court 
ruled that the per se exclusionary rule did not apply before indictment, 
and that its prior decisions in Commonwealth v. Guillory,39 Common-
35 356 Mass. 591, 254 N.E.2d 427 (1970). See also Commonwealth v. Mendes, 
1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 681, 281 N.E.2d 243. Commonwealth v. Cooper, 356 Mass. 
74, 248 N.E.2d 253 (1969). 
36 354 Mass. 494, 238 N.E.2d 343 (1968). 
37 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1571, 287 N.E.2d 118. 
38 Other identification cases came before the Supreme Judicial Court between 
the Kirby and Lopes decisions, but arguably, none were squarely within the ambit 
of Kirby. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Kirker, 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1281, 285 
N.E.2d 108, where the constitutional issue of the legality of the identification 
procedure was avoided because evidence on the point had been elicited by de-
fense counsel' on cross examination. 
39 356 Mass. 591, 254 N.E .. 2d 427 (1970). 
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wealth v. Cooper4o and Commonwealth v. Mendes41 would no longer be 
followed to the extent that they assume a right to counsel for identifica-
tion procedures at an earlier stage of prosecution. It was therefore un-
necessary to consider the validity of the effect of the waiver found by 
the trial judge. Applying the Kirby standard of due process, the Court 
found that the defendant was entitled to relief if the confrontation in 
the totality of the circumstances was "so unnecessarily suggestive and 
conducive to irreparable mistaken identification that he was denied due 
process of law."42 This was, of course, the familiar rule, already applied 
in cases where Wade and Gilbert did not apply.43 In Lopes, the identi-
fication took place two and a half months after the crime, and the police 
had used a lineup rather than a one-to-one confrontation, sometimes 
called a showup. Moreover, the trial judge found that the defendant, 
although viewed through a two-way mirror, had been advised that he 
was in a lineup for the purpose of identification, and also that the vic-
tim's identification at the police station was positive, consistent and un-
shaken. Relying on these findings, the Court found no basis for conclud-
ing that the lineup was impermissibly suggestive. The First Circuit's 
prior condemnation of two-way mirrors in Allen v. Moore44 did not 
bother the Court unduly. So long as the defendant knew that he was being 
so viewed, the Supreme Judicial Court saw no "flagrant constitutional 
violation" even though the accused was without counsel. Indeed the 
Lopes opinion seemed to find some great value on the use of two-way 
mirrors to protect witnesses from fear of harassment and retaliation. 
It is unfortunate that our Supreme Judicial Court is taking the position 
that it need only follow the minimal standards set forth in Kirby for 
administration of criminal justice. Kirby is a poorly reasoned decision 
which obviously marks the shift of political tides in the composition of 
the Supreme Court. It has effectively removed from defendants some 
measure of protection in a most crucial aspect of a criminal prosecution. 
To say that the right to counsel does not attach because there is no 
formal charge or indictment flies in the face of reality, not to mention 
the prior decisions of both the United States Supreme Court and the 
Supreme Judicial Court of this Commonwealth. An accused who is under 
arrest is being held on a probable cause, and as far as he and the State 
are concerned the criminal process against him has commenced. Other-
wise he would not be so held. While the per se exclusionary rule of Wade 
and Gilbert presents some difficulties of administration, the shifting of a 
large number of cases into a more ambiguous due process standard 
creates at least as many problems as it resolves. The "totality of the cir-
40 356 Mass. 74, 248 N.E.2d 253 (1969). 
41 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 681, 281 N.E.2d 243. 
42 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1571, 287 N.E.2d 118. 
43 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bumpus, note 36, supra; Commonwealth v. 
Thompson, note 20, supra. 
44 453 F.2d 970 (1st Cir. 1972). 
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cumstances" test or the due process test of Stovall v. Denno leaves a 
fluid and ambiguou& situation in which neither trial judges nor defendants, 
nor even the prosecution, have a clear idea of where they stand. It 
should be obvious in the wake of Kirby that most pretrial identifications 
will now be scheduled prior to indictment.45 By its retreat in the face of 
Kirby, the Supreme Judicial Court has elected not to join those courts 
of other states that have been willing in this or in other areas to take 
the lead in setting a standard of fairness for the administration of 
criminal justice.46 
§12.2. Privilege against self-incrimination. In the summer of 1971 
an investigation was begun by the Ohief Justice of the Massachusetts 
Superior Court into allegations of professional misconduct on the part 
of two justices of that court. During the course of the investigation, the 
Chief Justice interrogated one I. Charles Baker on August 25, 1971. 
Baker had also been interrogated by the State Police on August 5, 1971. 
When the matter came before the Supreme Judicial Court for a hearing, 
Baker invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 
His refusal to answer questions at the Supreme Judicial Court hearing, 
in light of his willingness to answer questions at the two earlier interroga-
tions, and the extent to which his previous answers constituted a waiver 
of his Fifth Amendment privilege were the principal issues in the case of 
In the Matter of Edward J. DeSaulnier, Jr. 1 
Although the opinion does not state exactly what matters Baker was 
trying to shield in the Supreme Judicial Court hearing, it can be inferred 
that he sought to be excused from testifying about a number of possible 
criminal activities, some committed by him prior to January 1, 1965, 
and others allegedly committed after January 1, 1968 (for which he was 
then under indictment in the superior court). The Court disposed of the 
post-1968 crimes by saying that Baker's liability for testifying about them 
was regulated by a binding stipulation between him and the District 
Attorney, assented to by the Attorney General. This stipulation pre-
cluded the use of Baker's testimony or any evidence discovered as a 
consequence thereof in any indictment charging larceny or conspiracy 
subsequent to January 1, 1965.2 As for the pre-1965 crimes, the time 
had elapsed within which a criminal prosecution could have been brought 
against him for those activities and the court held that he was precluded 
from asserting the privilege against self-incrimination when asked to 
testify about them. 
45 "As the California Supreme Court pointed out, with an eye toward the real 
world, 'the establishment of the date of formal accusation as the time wherein 
the right to counsel at lineup attaches could only lead to a situation wherein 
substantially all lineups would be conducted prior to indictment or information.' 
People v. Fowler, 1 Cal.3d 335, 344, 82 Cal. Rptr. 363, 370, 461 P. 2d 643, 650 
(1969)." Kirby v. lIIinois, 406 U.S. 682, 699 n.8 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
46 See, e.g., State v. Collins, 297 A.2d 620 (Maine 1972). 
§l2.2. 1 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1689, 276 N.E.2d 278. 
2 Id. at 1695, 276 N.E.2d at 282. 
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The denial of Baker's general claim of privilege was consistent with 
established practice in this Commonwealth. In 1964 the Supreme Court, 
in Malloy v. Hogan,3 extended the Fifth Amendment to the states via 
the Fourteenth Amendment. In Commonwealth v. Baker/ the Supreme 
Judicial Court held that the federal standards announced in Malloy 
must be used to determine whether a claim of privilege is justified. The 
essence of Malloy and Baker is that the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion will be sustained where it is evident from the implications of the 
question, in the setting in which it is asked, tha:t a responsive answer to 
it or an explanation of why it cannot be answered might constitute an 
incriminating disclosure.5 To deny the privilege, the judge must be 
certain that the answers cannot possibly tend to incriminate the claimant. 
Since the statute of limitations had run on all of Baker's pre-1965 crimes, 
he could not be prosecuted for them and hence he would incur no risk by 
testifying directly about them. If testimony of former crimes linked him 
in some way to more recent crimes for which he could still be prosecuted, 
the stipulation of immunity would release him from liability. 
If the Court had limited its decision to a denial of Baker's claim of 
privilege, it could have avoided the question of the extent to which 
Baker's answers to questions at the two earlier interrogations prevented 
him from raising the Fifth Amendment at the subsequent hearing. How-
ever, in an unusual move, the Court went out of its way to say what 
it would have decided if it had chosen to deal with the issue of waiver. 
The Court began by saying that Baker's answers to the Chief Justice 
and to the State Police did not constitute a general waiver for all purposes 
of his privilege against self-incrimination. In attempting to formulate a 
guiding principle, it rejected as too mechanical the rule laid down in 
other jurisdictions that waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination 
must occur in precisely the same proceeding in which the privilege is 
claimed. Instead, it proposed that: 
Where a witness assisted and advised by counsel has testified in pro-
ceedings or investigations obviously directed to the subject matter 
of an inquiry or an issue later before a court, and where the prior 
testimony has been recorded by a competent stenographer or has 
been written out in the presence of the witness, the witness's privilege 
is to be deemed waived (a) at least to the extent of the subject 
matter of the questions which he has answered, (b) where the pro-
ceeding in which the privilege is invoked is a probable, logical, or 
natural continuation or outgrowth of the proceeding or inquiry in 
which prior testimony has been given by the witness.6 
The Court's suggestion is an adaptation of the rule announced in 
3 378 U.S. 1 (1964). 
4 348 Mass. 60, 201 N.E.2d 829 (1964). 
5 See Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479 (1951). 
6 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1693, 276 N.E.2d at 281. 
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Ellis v. U. S'/ where the court declined to let a witness invoke the Fifth 
Amendment at a trial on an indictment returned by a grand jury when 
the witness had testified before that grand jury without then invoking 
the Fifth Amendment. The suggestion here amplifies the Ellis rule by 
adding that the waiver occurs only when the witness is assisted by counsel 
in his testimony and his answers are recorded. The version adopted by 
our Court seems much superior to that of the Ellis court. While its 
view is dictum, it seems clear that the Court was seeking to establish 
a reasonable guideline to govern any such similar matters as may occur 
in the future. To this extent, it has helpfully clarified local law in a 
difficult area. 
§12.3. Juvenile delinquency proceedings. In Commonwealth v. A 
Juvenile,l the court interpreted some aspects of the special evidentiary 
laws which govern juvenile delinquency proceedings. After a head-
ing in the juvenile session of the district court, the defendant juvenile 
was adjudicated a delinquent in that he did commit murder. The de-
fendant appealed to superior court and was adjudicated a delinquent on 
the same basis by a jury verdict. He appealed to the Supreme Judicial 
Court and assigned as error, among other things, a ruling that he was 
not allowed to use the transcript of evidence from the district court 
hearing in the cross-examination of witnesses in superior court. A further 
assignment of error related to allowance of testimony on behalf of the 
Commonwealth by the same witnesses who had previously testified against 
him in the district court. 
In considering the defendant's assignments of error, the Court dealt 
with G.L., c. 119, §60, which says that any adjudication of a child as a 
delinquent, or disposition thereunder of any child so adjudicated, or any 
evidence given in a delinquency hearing shall not be lawful or proper 
evidence against such child for any purpose in any proceeding in any 
court. The statute further provides that records in delinquency cases 
cannot be received in evidence or used in any way in further court pro-
ceedings against the child except in subsequent delinquency proceedings 
or in imposing sentence in a criminal proceeding. 
The Court first said there was no merit in the juvenile's contention 
that witnesses who testified in district court were disqualified from testi-
fying in superior court on the basis of the above statute. The seeming 
premise behind this contention was that if a witness testified in a de-
linquency hearing in district court and then testified again on the same 
case in superior court, his superior court testimony became "evidence" 
against the child drawn from the first stage of the delinquency pro-
ceeding and used against him in a further court proceeding. If this 
position were to prevail it would mean that only a fresh group of wit-
nesses would be allowed to testify in the superior court, and the prosecu-
7 416 F.2d 791 (D.C. Cir. 1969). 
§12.3. 1 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 361, 280 N.E.2d 144. 
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tion would be required to hold back some of its witnesses from the 
district court proceeding on the assumption that the case might eventually 
reach the superior court. Such a construction would render the statute 
ludicrous. 
In dealing with the defendant's other assignment of error, the Court 
said that it was error to prevent him from using the transcript of the 
delinquency hearing in the district court to impeach the credibility of 
witnesses for the Commonwealth in the superior court. Although it is 
not clear from the opinion, it appears that the judge in the superior 
court proceeding deemed the hearing in his Court a "proceeding in any 
court" so that the "evidence given in [the] delinquency hearing" against 
the defendant could not be used. The Supreme Judicial Court said this 
was an erroneous construction of the statute, because the section's 
proscription against use of evidence does not apply to further stages of 
the original delinquency complaint, including its trial on appeal in 
superior court and any appeal that might be taken to the Supreme 
Judicial Court. Failure to let the defendant use the transcript required 
reversal of the judgment and a new trial. 
The Court's decision draws a circle around the entire proceeding on 
the delinquency complaint and makes it one judicial unit so that evidence 
obtained on the first level can be used on succeeding levels. This holding 
follows logically from the court's finding that witnesses who testify on 
one level can testify throughout. This situation differs, of course, from 
the one where the original delinquency complaint has been dismissed, 
and the defendant juvenile is held on an independent criminal complaint.2 
Evidence obtained at the hearing on the criminal complaint, if otherwise 
competent, is admissible; but evidence from the dismissed delinquency 
hearing is not.3 
It is interesting to note that Section 60 only prohibits the use of 
evidence obtained in a delinquency hearing against the child. Here the 
defendant argued that he should be allowed to use the evidence for his 
own purposes. Although the Court held the lower court's construction 
of Section 60 inapplicable on broader grounds, the decision reaffirms the 
defendant's right to use prior inconsistent statements to impeach opposi-
tion witnesses, in accordance with the established practice. The Court 
indicates that this would be permitted even apart from the broad con-
struction of Section 60. The Court's position in this regard is also ob-
viously the only logical one. 
§12.4. Criminal discovery. Several noteworthy decisions in the 
area of criminal discovery were announced by the Court in the current 
survey year. 
Grand jury minutes. The necessity of showing "particularized need"· 
2 See G.L., c. 119, §75. 
3 Commonwealth v. Wallace, 346 Mass. 9, 16, 190 N.E.2d 224, 228 (1963). 
§ 12.4. • For a detailed examination of the "particularized need" doctrine in 
both the federal area and in Massachusetts, see §7.7, supra. 
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in order to inspect grand jury minutes was the issue before the court in 
Commonwealth v. DeChristoforo.2 The defendant and two others, Oreto 
and Gagliardi, were discovered by police to be riding in a car with the 
body of a man who had been shot to death. All three were indicted for 
first degree murder and illegal possession of firearms. Oreto was tried 
separately and pleaded guilty to second degree murder and the gun 
charges. Gagliardi and the defendant were tried together. At trial the 
Commonwealth conceded that Oreto and Gagliardi had fired the fatal 
shots, but it used evidence given by the arresting officer to connect the 
defendant with the plan to kill the deceased. Defendant claimed that he 
had nothing to do with the killing, but was only in the car for a ride 
home. In an attempt to impeach the officer's testimony, he argued that 
there were inconsistencies between the officer's testimony at trial and his 
testimony at an earlier probable cause hearing, and further that the 
officer's police report of the incident was also inconsistent with his trial 
testimony. 
The defendant filed two pretrial motions to inspect the minutes of 
the officer's testimony before the grand jury; both were denied. He re-
newed his motions during cross-examination of the officer at the trial, 
and moved in the alternative that the judge make an in camera inspec-
tion of the minutes. These motions too were denied. The court held 
that the defendant had shown no "particularized need" to see the grand 
jury minutes, ostensibly because neither of the prior inconsistent state-
ments was made as part of his testimony before the grand jury. Other 
factors diminishing the claim of "particularized need" were the de-
fendant's ability to use the inconsistencies between the officer's probable 
cause testimony and trial testimony, and the fact that the inconsistencies 
in the police report were clarified at the trial. The fact that the police 
officer had earlier attributed an inculpatory statement to Oreto (at the 
probable cause hearing) rather than to the defendant, as he did at the 
trial, seemed neither to impress the trial judge nor, ultimately, the 
majority of the Court. Neither was it significant to the trial judge or 
the majority that Gagliardi pleaded guilty to second degree murder and 
the firearms charges at the close of all the evidence, and that the jury 
had knowledge of that fact. 
The defendant was convicted of first degree murder and illegal pos-
session of firearms. He pressed several matters on appeal, including a 
claim of error in the denial of his motions for access to the grand jury 
minutes. The Court found no error, deciding that the defendant had 
shown no "particularized need" to inspect grand jury minutes. While 
the Court purported to follow the reasoning of previous Massachusetts 
decisions requiring "particularized need," the test itself is uncertain at 
best. It has evolved in Massachusetts to apply in an especially narrow 
and mechanical fashion. The only recent case which acknowledged a 
2 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1707, 277 N.E.2d 100. 
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"particularized need" was Commonwealth v. Carita} where a witness 
who had testified before the grand jury gave testimony at trial and then 
admitted that she had not given that same information to the grand jury. 
Since a defendant cannot inspect the grand jury testimony as a matter 
of right, it thus appears that he can only demonstrate "particularized 
need" if a witness admits his inconsistencies on the stand. 
The inadequacy of this standard was emphasized in Justice Spiegel's 
strongly worded dissent in which the Chief Justice joined.4 The majority 
had said that the defendant was not entitled to disclosure because he 
did not show that the grand jury minutes would cast further light on 
any of the alleged inconsistencies of the witness, or that the grand jury 
testimony given by the witness was inconsistent with his trial testimony. 
How, asked Justice Spiegel, could any defendant possibly know these 
things unless he first inspected the grand jury minutes, unless he were 
equipped with supernatural powers, or unless the witness admitted his 
inconsistencies on the stand? He also cited a number of federal cases 
holding that the defendant does have the right to examine a govern-
ment witness's grand jury testimony once the witness has testified at triaI.5 
The modem and realistic view of the matter is recognized by Justice 
Spiegel in citing the American Bar Association Standards Relating to 
Discovery and Procedure Before Trial §2.1(2) (iii), at 13 (Approved 
Draft 1970). Under this view, already adopted by several states, de-
fendants may inspect before trial any portions of the grand jury minutes 
pertaining to witnesses whom the prosecution intends to call at trial. 
But one need not go this far, as Justice Spiegel recognized. In DeChristo-
foro, the witness had already testified and the reasons for preserving 
grand jury secrecy as to the testimony of that witness had clearly ceased 
to exist.6 The majority's holding amounts to a flat prohibition against 
disclosure. It overlooks a number of Massachusetts cases holding that 
the trial judge should at least read the grand jury minutes upon request 
to determine if there is an inconsistency between a witness's testimony 
before the grand jury and his testimony at triaU If the Court will not 
make the minutes available to the defense where the witness has testified, 
it should at least require the trial judge to examine them in camera to 
determine if a "particularized need" exists. 
Evidence favorable to the defense. In Commonwealth v. Roberts,S a 
defendant under 17 years of age appealed his conviction in superior 
3 356 Mass. 132, 249 N.E.2d 5 (1969). 
4 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1707, 1724,277 N.E.2d 100, 112. 
5 See, e.g., Harris v. United States, 433 F.2d 1127, 1128-29 (D.C. Cir. 1970); 
United States v. Amabile, 395 F.2d 47, 53 (7th Cir., 1968); United States v. 
Youngblood, 379 F.2d 365, 370 (2d Cir. 1967). See also FED. R. CRIM. p. 6(e). 
6 See 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1707, 1727, 277 N.E.2d 100, 114. 
7 See Commonwealth v. Doherty, 353 Mass. 197, 229 N.E.2d 267 (1967); 
Commonwealth v. Abbot Engineering Inc., 351 Mass. 568. 222 N.E.2d 862 (1967); 
Commonwealth v. Kiernan, 348 Mass. 29, 201 N.E.2d 504 (1964). 
S 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1477, 285 N.E.2d 919. 
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court for anned robbery, assigning as error the failure to quash his 
indictment on the ground that the police prosecutor at his juvenile court 
hearing did not disclose to defense counsel that two eyewitnesses had 
failed to select the defendant's photograph from a group of three or 
four photographs shown to them by police on the evening of the robbery, 
and had later selected two from a group of two hundred pictures at 
police headquarters which "looked like ... the two boys."9 Neither 
picture selected was that of the defendant. The defendant claimed that 
the failure to disclose this information to his counsel constituted sup-
pression of evidence "material to the decision of the juvenile court judge 
to dismiss the delinquency proceedings and order the issuance of a 
criminal complaint." Relying on Brady v. Maryland,lo and subsequent 
federal cases, he argued that this suppression was a denial of due process 
under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
The Commonwealth countered this contention by arguing that the due 
process requirements of Brady and later decisions do not apply because 
the question of guilt or innocence is immaterial to a juvenile court hear-
ing such as that in question; the purpose of such proceedings is "merely 
to decide whether [to try] the defendant ... as a delinquent child or a 
criminal offender."ll The Court did not deal with the Commonwealth's 
contention. Rather it based its decision on a finding that, even if juvenile 
hearings were within the ambit of the due process requirements of Brady, 
the nondisclosure of evidence in the instant case did not warrant re-
versal. Citing U.S. v. Keogh 12 and Commonwealth v. Earlp the Court 
said there was no evidence that this was a deliberate refusal to disclose 
evidence after a request or a deliberate attempt by the prosecution to 
withhold knowledge of its existence. The prosecutor at the hearing was 
a police officer rather than an attorney. The Court pointed out that he 
may have failed to appreciate the use to which the defense counsel 
might have put the evidence and assumed it was of no consequence since 
the two witnesses who had previously failed to select the defendant's 
photo, as well as three other witnesses, had identified the defendant in 
person. The Court thus applied the Keogh standard: where the suppres-
sion was not deliberate and no request was made for the material, a 
substantially higher probability that disclosure of the evidence would 
have altered the result is required. Since three other eyewitnesses identi-
fied the defendant, the Court was convinced "beyond a reasonable doubt" 
that there was no such probability that disclosure would have altered 
the result. 
The precise implications of the Roberts decision remain unclear. If 
the failure to disclose the evidence was held hannless error because it 
was not sufficiently probable that disclosure would have altered the re-
g Id. at 1479, 285 N.E.2d at 922. 
10 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
11 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1477, 1480, 285 N.E.2d 919, 922. 
12 391 F.2d 138 (2d Cir. 1968). 
13 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1081,283 N.E.2d 677. 
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sult, the decision is probably correct. However, the opinion suggests that 
there was no violation of due process because the prosecutor had no 
duty to disclose the evidence. 1£ this is what the opinion means, it over-
looks the distinction between the type of evidence suppressed in Keogh 
and that in the present case. The evidence in Keogh was an FBI report 
on the financial status of one of the government witnesses and it was not 
on its face favorable to the defendant. It later turned out that Keogh 
could have used the information to his advantage, but the prosecutor 
might reasonably have overlooked the value of the information. Here, 
however, the prosecutor could not fail to know that a misidentification 
would help the defense. In United States v. Deleo,14 also cited in Roberts, 
the court of appeals decided upon similar facts, not that there was no 
duty to disclose this material, but that the failure to do so was harmless 
error. 
Although the result in Roberts is probably correct, the Court should 
have clarified the prosecutor's duty to disclose evidence that might be 
helpful to the defense. The objectives of Keogh are laudable: to balance 
the rights of the defendant against the burden on the prosecution and 
preserve the finality of judgments. Nevertheless, the usefulness of a prior 
misidentification by a witness is obvious and the defendant should not 
be made to suffer because the prosecutor lacks legal competence. 
In Commonwealth v. Thompson,15 the Court also considered a due 
process claim predicated upon Brady v. Maryland. 16 Like Roberts the 
evidence related to identification. Unlike Roberts, Thompson involved 
a superior court trial of an adult on charges of assault and battery and 
assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon. Presumptively, 
the prosecutor in this case was neither inexperienced nor unaware of 
the full extent of his prosecutorial responsibility for a fair trial. 
After Thompson had been convicted he filed two motions for a new 
trial alleging newly discovered evidence. Each motion was accompanied 
by an affidavit of one Bolis. In substance, the affidavits stated that the 
affiant had been present at the scene of the alleged assault, and that after 
viewing the defendant through a two way mirror at police headquarters, 
he stated to police that defendant had not been present at the scene. 
Both motions were denied. While the Court on appeal discounted the 
significance of the first affidavit, it admitted that the second affidavit 
contained on its face evidence "very favorable" to the defendant which 
"might indeed be material to the issue of gllilt." However, it denied 
the appeal on the ground that the trial judge could and did disbelieve 
the second affidavit. His finding could be upheld in light of the principles 
that the validity of such affidavits are matters to be determined in the 
trial judge's discretion.16 By taking this stance, the Court was a:ble to 
avoid the main thrust of defendant's argument, namely, that this was 
14 422 F .2d 487, 498-99 (1st Cir. 1970). 
15 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1503, 286 N.E.2d 333. 
16 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
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not merely a case where a new trial was warranted because of newly 
discovered evidence, but one of prosecutorial misconduct in failing to 
disclose evidence favorable to the defense prior· to or during the trial. 
Thus, the impact of the constitutional rule of Brady v. Maryland was 
avoided, and the real issue apparently unresolved. 
§12.5. Statutory Changes. During the 1972 SURVEY year, the legis-
lature made a number of changes in G.L., c. 90, §24, which deals with 
drunk driving. One addition to the statute makes a certificate by a 
chemist of the Department of Public Safety, containing the results of 
his analysis of the percentage by weight of alcohol in the blood of a 
defendant, prima facie evidence of such percentage. 1 Another change 
in the statute lowers the prima facie level of presumption of operating 
under the influence of intoxicating liquor from a percentage of 15 one-
hundredths to 10 one-hundredths by weight of alcohol in a defendant's 
blood.2 The third change deals with a person's refusal to submit to a 
blood alcohol test or breath analysis. Before the latest change, a person 
who drove upon a public way in the Commonwealth was deemed to 
have consented to submit to such test if he was arrested for driving a 
car while under the influence of liquor. A person who refused to submit 
to a test could not be compelled to do so, but his refusal was duly noted 
in a written report made by the police officer before whom such refusal 
was made. The person was tHen subject to suspension of his license for 
ninety days. Under the amended provision, the arresting officer must 
inform the person of the ninety day suspension which follows a refusal 
to undergo the test. Furthermore the report of the arresting officer must 
be endorsed by a third person who witnessed the refusal.3 The amend-
ment adds the kind of due process safeguards that are necessary in a 
statute that prescribes summary and discretionary sanctions. 
Two other statutes utilizing the approach of "prima facie evidence" 
were enacted. Chapter 252 of the Acts of 1972 amends G.L. c. 147 by 
inserting Section 4F providing that a certificate by a chemist of the De-
partment of Public Safety showing the presence of sperm cells or seminal 
fluid in any material or substance furnished by a police officer of any 
department shall be prima facie evidence of the same if the certificate 
is signed and sworn to by such chemist. Chapter 268 of the Acts of 1972 
adding Section 121A to G.L. c. 140, has a similar effect with regard to 
ballistics results certified by ballistics experts of the Department of Public 
Safety provided such expert had previously qualified as such in a court 
proceeding. 
Finally, we note that one of the Commonwealth's most peculiar ways 
of impeaching the credibility of a witness may soon be no more than a 
17 Commonwealth v. Heffernan, 350 Mass. 48, 53, 213 N.E.2d 399, 403 
(1966) . 
§ 12.5. 1 Acts of 1972, c. 376. 
2 Acts of 1972, c. 488, 11. 
3 Acts of 1972, c. 488, 12. 
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historical relic: the legislature has passed a resolve providing for an 
investigation into the feasibility of prohibiting admission of evidence of 
a witness' disbelief in the existence of God as a means of affecting his 
credibility.4 
4 Resolves of 1972, c. 39, Cf. G.L., c. 233, §19. See also, LEACH AND LIACOS, 
HANDBOOK OF MASSACHUSETTS EVIDENCE 126·127. 
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